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Abstract 
Political risk, like all other risks, has an adverse effect on any economy. Even though other forms of 
risk, such as economic risk and financial risk have been studied quite extensively, political risk has 
not received much attention owing primarily to lack of data. The current paper attempts to study a 
negative and significant relationship between political risk and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
accounting for 94 countries over a span of 24 years from 1986-2009. It was found that most of the 
political risk indicators have a negative relationship with FDI for the world as a whole and also, the 
high-income countries but the relationship was the strongest for the upper middle-income countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been a subject of interest for decades. The influx of FDI 
surged primarily in the 1980s when lending by commercial banks to the developing economies dried 
up, which forced most countries to ease restrictions and offer tax incentives and subsidies to attract 
foreign capital (Aitken and Harrison 1999; World Bank 1997a, b). Consequently, FDI contributes 
positively to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the host countries by bringing in foreign exchange 
reserves and improvement of the Balance of Payment (BoP) for the local economies. The rate of 
technological progress enhances with FDI since foreign firms bring in more advanced technology and 
management practices to the host countries (Findlay 1978). Romer (1993) further adds that FDI can 
ease the transfer of technological and business know-how to the less developed economies with the 
consequent reduction of the ‘idea gaps’ between rich and poor countries. In addition, the new ideas 
can ‘spill over’ to other sectors and segments of the economy which are not FDI recipients; thereby, 
boosting the productivity of more firms in the process (Rappaport 2000).  
Theoretically, the two most important determinants of FDI are the size and growth of the host 
country and cost competitiveness. Empirical studies determined market size, wages and political 
stability to affect the location decisions of FDIs (Dunning 1993). Taking the case of Western Europe 
in the 1950s, Reuber et al. (1973) found that the determinants of US FDI depended mainly on liberal 
host government policies, technological infrastructure, skilled labour and cultural proximity. 
Additionally, Froot and Stein (1991) found real exchange rate to be a significant factor affecting FDI. 
The O (ownership) L (location) I (internalization) paradigm regarding a firm’s motivation for 
investment in foreign countries, Dunning (1998) states that the ownership and internalization 
advantages are derived using firm-specific resources and capabilities, in conjunction with reduction in 
transaction costs, while location advantages refer to the ability to capture broader markets and 
resources. 
Despite numerous studies identifying determinants of FDI, one factor remains to receive much 
attention owing primarily to high quality data – political risk
1
. Logically, it should be the case that 
political risk would have a significant negative impact on FDI. Political instability increases 
uncertainty in the economic environment, thereby lowering the incentives for foreign investors to 
invest in the host country. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) has disseminated separate financial, economic, and 
political ratings over the period 1984-2009 and has identified twelve different political risk indices. 
Theoretically, there seems to be a relationship between FDI and political risks, which is precisely the 
analysis undertaken in the current study. 
The next section reviews the existing literature on the subject and evidence from the results. 
Section 3 discusses the underlying theory and specifies the models to be employed in the study along 
with the estimation techniques. Section 4 provides the regression results with interpretations, and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
It should be noted at the outset that very few authors have tried to measure the impact of risk 
factors on FDI. The primary hindrance associated with risks is their quantitative measurements. Click 
                                                     
1Political risk is defined as the possibility that political events in a country will affect the 
business climate and investors will not make as much money as expected (Howell, 2001). 
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(2005), in an attempt to measure political risk, deducted financial risks from total country risks to 
calculate political risks. The standard deviation of each country’s regression residuals was assumed to 
provide a measure of the unexplained country risk, i.e. the unobserved political risk. The study 
showed differences in Return on Assets (ROA) related to measurable financial risk variables. To 
further examine whether country risk captured political risk, correlations of residual deviations were 
computed by the author with other country and political risk indicators. Consequently, it was revealed 
that the correlation between residual deviations and average Euro money, Institutional Investor and 
ICRG ratings was moderately high, establishing the notion of a significant correlated relationship. The 
author concluded that political risk is unrelated to ROA of the companies. 
On the other hand, other studies have deployed “corruption” as a measure of political risk and 
calculated its subsequent impact on FDI. Corruption is defined by Getz and Volkema (2001) as the 
abuse of public roles and resources for private benefit or the misuse of public office for non-official 
ends. Corruption has a disincentive effect on investment since it increases the risk and uncertainty 
encountered by potential investors (Getz and Volkema 2001), thereby, discouraging investors to make 
further investments in such political risky economies. Another barrier or disincentive for foreign 
investors to invest in host countries can be imposed by corruption in the form of distortionary effects 
(monies paid for bribery being inefficiently allocated) (Goudie and Stasavage 1997).  
Robertson and Watson (2004) study the impact of corruption on changes in levels of FDI from a 
strategic perspective. They incorporated strategic decisions which managers of multinational 
companies (MNCs) need to adopt in the presence of political risks. In addition, they introduced the 
culture of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity; masculinity referring to masculine values of 
assertiveness, aggressiveness, and materialism that lead to high levels of corruption, which tend to be 
more social (Hofstede 1997). The study used the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 1999 and 
2000, while uncertainty avoidance and masculinity measures were taken from Hofstede (1997) 
cultural dimension scores. Employing a simple OLS hierarchical regression analysis with control 
variables such as GNP per capita, GNP and consumption, results of the study indicate that the more 
rapid the rate of change in FDI, the higher is the level of corruption. Additionally, the culture traits of 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity and also associated with higher levels of perceived corruption. 
Focusing on the same issue, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) examined the impact of corruption on 
FDI for 89 countries over the 1996-1998 periods. The analysis displayed a negative impact of 
corruption on FDI. Moreover, the study found a negative effect due to the difference in corruption 
intensity between the host and home countries. The results suggest that foreign investors generally 
avoid corruption because of moral obligations and also the operational inefficiencies that arise due to 
corruption. More importantly, foreign investors avoid corruption because it can be difficult to 
manage, and is risky and costly at the same time. However, the study relied on the perception-based 
measure of corruption, which fails to capture the different forms of corruption exerting varying 
impacts on FDI. 
Wei (2000) analyzed data on FDI in the early 1990s from 12 source countries and 45 host 
countries. Corruption revealed to have a significant and negative effect on FDI. Mauro (1995) also 
found corruption to have a negative impact on investment, thus resulting in diminished economic 
growth. In fact, papers such as Campos and Nugent (2002) point out that the negative impact of 
political risk on economic growth is now regarded as ‘stylized fact’. They state that political 
instability increases uncertainty in the economic environment, thereby disrupting production and 
reducing capital investment, which, in turn, affects economic growth.  
However, studies such as Nye (1979), found that corruption has a positive impact on economic 
growth and development while Hines (1995) derived a non-significant relationship. Hence, it can be 
deduced that the relationship between political risk (via corruption) and economic growth is still 
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ambiguous. Thus, the present study aims to explore the political risk indices and learn the respective 
indicator’s impact on FDI.  
 
3. Theoretical Estimations and Modelling 
 
The present study attempts to capture the effect of political risk on FDI controlling for GDP, 
which is taken to account for the economic growth of a country. FDI stocks
2
 have been considered as 
the dependent variable for all the countries considered in the study. We measure the FDI stocks in 
terms of USD in current prices and current exchange rates. Data was collected for 94 countries over a 
span of 24 years from 1986-2009. The countries were then classified into four groups based on GDP 
per capita (Appendix A-1). 
Theoretically, the larger the size of the market and more the overall GDP, the more profits are to 
be made by foreign investors and, hence, the higher the FDI
3
. Therefore, one of the control variables 
for the current paper is GDP
4
. Another important factor affecting FDI is the openness of the economy 
(openness
5
 is denoted by the amount of exports and imports over GDP). Both GDP and openness are 
expected to have a positive relationship with FDI leading to higher economic growth and better 
standards of living. 
It is the case that higher political risk might arise in different circumstances such as, political 
instability, poor law and order, etc. The higher the political risk, the higher the probability that the 
investment in the host economy will decrease. Hence, political risk can be stated to be a significant 
factor affecting FDI. 
Thus, the model (unadjusted for individual and/or time specific effects) is: 
FDIit= α + β1GDPit+ β2opennessit + β3PRkit+ eit  (1) 
where, 
FDI  = Log of FDI measured in current prices and current exchange rates 
GDP  = Log of GDP measured in current USD 
Openness =  Log of Openness measured in current prices 
PRk  = Log of the Political Risk Component k of country i (PRki)  
 
(PRk), where k refers to one of twelve different indices viz. Government Stability, Socioeconomic 
Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, 
Religion in Politics, Law & Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability and Bureaucracy 
Quality. To eliminate zero values so that logarithm exists, 1 has been added to all the political risk 
indices; and 
it = country i, year t. 
 
3.1 Estimation Techniques 
 
Log is taken of all the four variables (FDI, GDP, Openness and Political Risk indices) with an aim 
to stabilize variance and make symmetric distributions so that the respective coefficients are not 
influenced by extreme values. It is to be noted that one political risk component is examined at a time 
                                                     
2 Data collected from UNCTAD 
3OECD, 2000 
4Data collected from the World Bank 
5 Taken from Penn World Table 
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to measure the effects of individual political risk indices and evade the high correlation between them. 
Moreover, the original indices indicated that the higher the index, the lower the political risk. 
However, to ease the interpretation of results, the maximum value of each of the indicator was 
deducted from the existing values to ensure that higher indices reflected higher political risks. 
Since the study examines a range of countries over a span of time, panel data is a more 
appropriate methodology for the study. Five different estimation techniques have been used, namely, 
Pooled OLS, One-Way and Two-Way Fixed Effects Model and One-Way and Two-Way Random 
Effects Model. 
Pooled OLS runs a simple OLS regression by stacking the time series data of the cross-sections, 
one above another. Thus, we estimate the following model: 
FDIit= α + β1GDPit+ β2opennessit + β3PRkit+ eit   (2) 
where the symbols represent the same elements as mentioned before.  
In order to explore if country-specific factors (like government policy, investment climate, etc.) 
affect FDI, we use the One-Way Fixed Effects Model. This model recognizes that different cross-
sectional elements will have different attributes not captured in the model but assumes that for a given 
cross section, they will remain time-invariant. The effect of these attributes is captured in the 
intercepts. Thus, the model we estimate through this approach is: 
FDIit= αi + β1GDPit+ β2opennessit + β3PRkit+ eit   (3) 
where the i of the intercept indicates the unobserved individual country-specific factors which is 
assumed to remain fixed over time (the other variables representing the same variables as before). 
Two-Way Fixed Effects Model examines both country-specific and time-specific (exchange rates, 
oil prices, etc.) dimensions. It considers the effects of both individual-variant and time-variant 
attributes, thereby leading to better parameter estimates (Gujarati 2003).  
Also, the model eliminates omitted variable bias. Hence, the model for this approach is: 
FDIit= αit + β1GDPit+ β2opennessit + β3PRkit+ eit                     (4) 
where the i and t of the intercept capture both the country-specific and time-specific attributes (the 
other variables representing the same elements as before). 
Moving on, the Random Effects models capture individual or time-specific effects through the 
random error term. In the Random-Effects model, the intercept represents the mean value of the cross-
section intercepts and the error component represents the random deviation of individual intercept 
from the mean value (Gujarati 2003). One-Way Random Effects model captures only the individual-
specific effects and assumes them to be time-invariant.  
The model estimated here is: 
FDIit= α + β1GDPit+ β2opennessit + β3PRkit+ ui + eit   (5) 
where ui captures individual-specific random effects (and the other variables represent the same 
elements as before). 
Two-Way Random Effects model captures both country and time-specific effects. Therefore, 
another error component vt is added to the regular error term in the model to capture time-specific 
random effects. Therefore, the model is: 
FDIit= α + β1GDPit+ β2opennessit + β3PRkit+ ui+ vt + eit            (6) 
where vt captures the time-specific effects (the other variables representing the same elements as 
mentioned previously). 
With an array of models available for estimation, the best model has to be chosen from the 
available estimation techniques. Pooled OLS can be negated though, since individual-specific or time-
specific effects prevail across the countries that might not be captured in the model specification. 
However, whether to capture these individual-specific and time-specific effects in the intercept or in a 
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random error component can be deduced using specification tests. The decision rules for each of the 
specification tests follow in the discussion. 
High Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics with associated low p-values deduce 
substantial cross-section variation and rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedastic pooled OLS. 
Accordingly, high F-test statistic with low p-values in the Fixed Effects models rejects the null 
hypothesis of no fixed effects. On the other hand, high Hausman test statistic, denoted by m, and low 
p-values in Random Effects models imply the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
regressors, ultimately rejecting the individual effects.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
For the World and sub-divisions of countries (list of countries attached in Appendix A-1), the 
One-Way and Two-Way Fixed Effects models are preferred over Random-Effects Models since the 
null hypothesis of no fixed effects is rejected (with regard to F-tests) and the null hypothesis of no 
correlation (with regard to m) is rejected at the same time. Hence, it can be stated that the fixed effects 
are, therefore, the better models for the currently considered dataset. 
4.1 World 
 
Regression results display GDP and Openness to be significant, that too at 1% significance level, 
with almost all the estimation models and all the political risk indicators. GDP and Openness have a 
positive relationship with FDI and hence, this was one of the reasoning to consider the formers as the 
control variables for the respective regressions.   
 
Table 1: Summary of parameter estimates of political risk indicators on FDI 
*** indicates significance at 1% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
World 
Political Risk 
Components 
One-way Fixed Two-way Fixed 
Significant Insignificant Significant Insignificant 
Government Stability -0.31**   0.036 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
-0.17***  -0.30***  
Investment Profile -0.33***   -0.07 
Internal Conflict  -0.028  0.023 
External Conflict  0.004  0.017 
Corruption 0.55***  0.13**  
Military in Politics 0.195***  0.195*** -0.001 
Religion in Politics  0.002  -0.024 
Law and Order  -0.02 -0.156***  
Ethnic Tensions  -0.009  -0.066 
Democratic 
Accountability 
 -0.007  0.061 
Bureaucratic Quality  0.074 -0.21***  
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As can be seen from the table above (Table 1), political risk indicators, in the form of 
Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions and Investment Profile showed strong negative 
relationship with FDI for the One-way Fixed Effects Model. This is in line with the hypothesis that 
political risk has a negative impact on FDI. Corruption and Military in Politics also showed 
significance, although with a positive coefficient, implying that an increase in the respective 
indicators would actually lead to increased FDI, controlling for individual effects. The majority of the 
remaining indicators were insignificant, although having a negative relationship with FDI. 
For the Two-Way Fixed Effects model, Socioeconomic Conditions, Law and Order and 
Bureaucratic Quality displayed significant negative results. Law and Order and Bureaucratic Quality 
were not significant in One-Way Fixed Effects model, indicating time-specific effects to impact these 
indicators, and imposing a negative effect on FDI. However, in line with the One-Way Fixed Effects 
model, Corruption and Military in Politics showed positive relationship, establishing the impact of 
these two political risk factors on FDI. 
4.2 High Income Countries 
 
A summary of the results of the detailed regression results for high-income countries (HICs) is 
presented in Table 2. Similar to the World, the FDI of HICs also exhibited positive significant 
relationship (at 1% significance level) with GDP and Openness. In terms of Political Risk indicators, 
Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions and Investment Profile showed significant negative 
relationship with FDI, for the One-Way Fixed Effects Model. Corruption, Military in Politics, 
Religion in Politics, Ethnic Tensions and Bureaucratic Quality showed positive significant 
relationship with FDI. Except the last three Political Risk indicators, the former indicators are in line 
with the World dataset outcome. Compared to the World, the HICs incorporate less insignificant 
variables. Now, with the segregation of economies, the results become more concrete. The Two-Way 
Fixed Effects Model shows significant indicators with a negative coefficient –significant indicators 
having a positive coefficient in the One-Way Fixed Effects Model take up the negative coefficient.  
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Table 2: Summary of results of the parameter estimates of political risk indicators on FDI 
*** indicates significance at 1% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High-Income Countries 
Political Risk 
Components 
One-way Fixed Two-way Fixed 
Significant Insignificant Significant Insignificant 
Government Stability -0.18***   -0.066 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
-0.37***  -0.17**  
Investment Profile -0.24***  0.26***  
Internal Conflict  -0.001  -0.07 
External Conflict  0.07 -0.09**  
Corruption 0.26***   -0.11 
Military in Politics 0.16**  0.23***  
Religion in Politics 0.32***  0.17**  
Law and Order  0.03 -0.16***  
Ethnic Tensions 0.13**  -0.16***  
Democratic 
Accountability 
 0.07  0.09 
Bureaucratic Quality 0.29**   0.08 
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4.3 Upper Middle Income Countries 
 
A sum up of the regression results for upper middle-income countries (UMICs) is presented in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Summary of results of the parameter estimates of political risk indicators on FDI 
*** indicates significance at 1% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
 
Interestingly, for the UMICs, the Two-Way Fixed Effects model showed negative relationship 
between Openness and FDI, while keeping to the positive relationship between GDP and the latter. 
The economic implication for this may be explained by the substitutability between exports and 
imports and FDI. It is the case that exports together with imports increased with lesser dependence on 
FDI. However, the hypothesis is consistent for the other four models under consideration, that is, the 
relationship being negative and significant. 
For the UMICs, Government Stability, Investment Profile and Ethnic Tensions showed negative 
and significant relationship with FDI. However, other significant Political Risk indicators including 
Socioeconomic Conditions, External Conflict, Corruption, Law and Order and Bureaucratic Quality 
showed positive and significant relationship with FDI. This could be because of the upward trend of 
FDI in these countries over the last few decades. Hence, political risk indicators have not been as 
significant a factor in these countries as they have been in the HICs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upper Middle-Income Countries 
Political Risk 
Components 
One-way Fixed Two-way Fixed 
Significant Insignificant Significant Insignificant 
Government Stability -0.31***   0.14 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
0.59***   0.068 
Investment Profile -0.20**  0.359***  
Internal Conflict  -0.04  0.07 
External Conflict 0.13**  0.27***  
Corruption 0.81***  0.23*  
Military in Politics  0.09 0.34***  
Religion in Politics  -0.01 0.25***  
Law and Order 0.32***   -0.10 
Ethnic Tensions -0.27**   -0.06 
Democratic 
Accountability 
 0.06  0.11 
Bureaucratic Quality 0.23*   0.02 
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4.4 Lower Middle Income Countries 
 
Table 4: Summary of results of the parameter estimates of political risk indicators on FDI 
*** indicates significance at 1% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
 
Similar to the reporting of the previous tables, Table 4 presents the review of the results for the 
lower middle-income countries (LMICs) and their respective regressions. GDP and Openness are 
positively correlated at 1% significance level with FDI for all the models in this group of countries. 
The results for the LMICs support the hypothesis of the paper strongly. Most of the indicators for both 
One-Way and Two-Way Fixed Effects models are significant and negative at 1% significant level. 
Only Corruption, Military in Politics, Socioeconomic Conditions, External Conflict and Bureaucratic 
Quality showed insignificant results. The reasoning could be that the data for these indicators might 
have been too volatile, which rendered the results to be insignificant. The implication of the analysis 
is that political risk indicators are more relevant in these countries in comparison to other countries 
around the world. Also, their negative coefficients are higher for most indicators, indicating the 
hypothesis of negative relationship between political risk and FDI to be strongly supported for these 
countries.  
4.5 Low Income Countries 
 
For the LICs, Government Stability and External Conflict have shown significant negative results 
in One-Way Fixed Effects model. This is evident in Table 5, which presents a summary of the 
regression results of the low-income countries (LICs). On the other hand, External Conflict, Religion 
in Politics and Bureaucratic Quality has shown negative and significant results in Two-Way Fixed 
Effects model. For the developing countries, religion and bureaucracy are more pressing issues and 
explain why such indicators have shown negative results. Other indicators have shown either 
insignificant results or positive significance (Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, Corruption and 
Lower Middle Income Countries 
Political Risk 
Components 
One-way Fixed Two-way Fixed 
Sig. Insig. Sig. Insig. 
Government Stability -0.38***  -0.21**  
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
 0.16 -0.40***  
Investment Profile -0.27***   -0.06 
Internal Conflict -0.22***  -0.23***  
External Conflict  -0.04  -0.03 
Corruption  -0.05  -0.16 
Military in Politics  0.12  -0.01 
Religion in Politics -0.28***  -0.26***  
Law and Order -0.45***  -0.54***  
Ethnic Tensions -0.25***  -0.17**  
Democratic 
Accountability 
-0.21***  -0.26***  
Bureaucratic Quality  -0.12 -0.29***  
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Military in Politics), possibly signifying that for the LICs, other factors play a greater role in 
determining the inflows of FDI, while at the same time data volatility cannot also be ignored.  
 
Table 5: Summary of results of the parameter estimates of political risk indicators on FDI 
*** indicates significance at 1% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
With FDI’s cosmic importance in the economics and business arena, numerous studies have been 
carried out to find the determinants. The current study was performed to shed light on a topic that has 
not received much attention. Political risk as a determinant of FDI has received attention only 
recently, though under the narrower meaning – corruption (Habib and Zurawicki 2002). Thus, this 
paper presents the raison-d-etre for a detailed analysis of the impact of political risk on FDI, taking 
different indicators of the former, including corruption. 
The regression results of World and HICs show similar results. Government Stability, 
Socioeconomic Conditions and Investment Profile show negative and significant relationship with 
FDI in these regions, as was predicted in the hypothesis. However, Corruption and Military in Politics 
both posited positive relationship with FDI. For the UMICs, a few of the indicators were negative and 
significant but most of them were positive, indicating that political risk indicators does not pose a 
significant influence in these countries as the trend in FDI for these countries has been largely 
upward-sloping. The hypothesis was supported most strongly for the LMIC sub-division. Most of the 
indicators were negative and significant with their coefficients being higher than in the other regions, 
implying that political risk is a greater threat in the LMICs in comparison to the rest of the World. 
Evidence of religion and bureaucracy having a negative impact on FDI was observed very strongly for 
the LICs.  
Low Income Countries 
Political Risk 
Components 
One-way Fixed Two-way Fixed 
Sig. Insig. Sig. Insig. 
Government Stability -0.31***  0.46***  
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
1.71***   -0.29 
Investment Profile  0.09 0.63***  
Internal Conflict  -0.07 0.21*  
External Conflict -0.34***  -0.18*  
Corruption 1.16***  0.50**  
Military in Politics 0.65***  0.43**  
Religion in Politics  -0.033 -0.74***  
Law and Order  0.01  -0.15 
Ethnic Tensions  0.02  0.21 
Democratic 
Accountability 
 0.23 0.68***  
Bureaucratic Quality  0.35 -0.45**  
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Political risk factors are difficult to quantify. Most studies thus far have used a particular form of 
political risk, the mostly commonly used proxy being corruption, to explain its adverse effects on FDI 
and other economic forces. However, using the ICRG index, this study has empirically deduced that 
political risk factors play an important role in determining FDI inflows. In this context, the 
government of respective countries, particularly in the LMICs, should try to contain political risks to 
the furthest extent since the indicators conclude that the LMICs are more prone to political risks and 
uncertainties. However, different regression results for different groups of countries indicate that 
caution must be adopted to deal with risk factors that pertain to a particular country in order to 
properly utilize a country’s potential.  
Since the political indicators in the study are categorized, it is advantageous to identify the 
different types of political risks which are characteristic of the different sub-divisions. It is also 
important that political parties, other stakeholders and bureaucrats in these countries take into account 
the fact that aggravation of political situations in the countries would lead to an overall negative 
impact. The consensus, disregarding any region or country, should be to reduce political risks and 
uncertainties since political instability play an important role in the determination of FDI and 
consequently, the long-run economic performance of a country. 
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BoP – Balance of Payment 
CPI – Corruption Perception Index 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GNP – Gross National Product 
HICs – High-income countries 
ICRG – International Country Risk Guide 
LICs – Low income countries 
LM – Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
LMICs – Lower middle-income countries 
MNCs – Multinational Companies 
OLS – Ordinary Least Square regression 
PR – Political Risk 
ROA – Return on Assets 
UMICs – Upper middle-income countries  
USD – United States Dollar 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table: Classification of Countries according to GDP/Capita (according to World Bank 
classification) 
 
High-income 
economies ($12,276 or 
more) 
 
Upper-middle-income 
economies ($3,976- 
$12,275) 
Lower-middle-income 
economies ($1,006-
$3,975) 
Low-income 
economies ($1,005 or 
less) 
 
Australia 
Austria 
The Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Belgium 
Canada  
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Malta 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Oman 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Panama  
Peru 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Angola 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
Bangladesh 
Burkina Faso 
Congo, DR 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Zimbabwe 
 
